The purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment of the global economic impacts of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) as well as to provide a more comprehensive approach to estimating the global consequences of major disease outbreaks. Our empirical estimates of the economic effects of the SARS epidemic are based on a global model called the G-Cubed (Asia Pacific) model. Most previous studies on the economic effects of epidemics focus on the disease-associated medical costs or forgone incomes resulting from disease-related morbidity and mortality, but the most significant real costs of SARS have been generated by changes in spending behavior by households and firms in affected countries. This study estimates the cost of the SARS outbreak by focusing on the impacts on consumption and investment behavior through changes in the cost and risk of doing business. Through increased economic interdependence, these changes in behavior have wide-ranging general equilibrium consequences for the world economy that can lead to economic losses well in excess of the traditional estimates of the cost of disease.
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Introduction
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has put the world on alert. The virus appears to be highly contagious and is fatal for about 10 percent of patients. In the 6 months after the ªrst outbreak in the Chinese province of Guangdong in November 2002, SARS spread to at least 28 countries, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Africa, Spain, and the United States. As of 14 July 2003, the number of probable SARS cases had reached 8,437 worldwide (table 1) . By the apparent end of the outbreak in July 2003, the death toll had reached 813, including 348 in China and 298 in Hong Kong.
Scientists do not know all the details about the coronavirus that causes SARS. The precise mechanism by which this atypical pneumonia is spread is still unclear. Many countries successfully contained the SARS outbreak and local transmission, but the disease might recur in 2004.
1 Experts predict that the likelihood of discovering a vaccine or treatment for SARS in the foreseeable future is very low.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a preliminary assessment of the global economic impacts of SARS. We update our estimates from an earlier version of this paper, dated May 2003, with ªnal information on the number of SARS cases and the knowledge that the SARS epidemic lasted approximately 6 months rather than the full year originally assumed. Our empirical estimates of the economic effects of the SARS epidemic are based on a global model called the G-Cubed (Asia Paciªc) model. Most previous studies of the economic effects of epidemics focus on economic costs involving the disease-associated medical costs or forgone incomes resulting from disease-related morbidity and mortality. However, the direct consequences of the SARS epidemic in terms of medical expenditures or demographic effects seem to be rather small, particularly when compared with those of other major epidemics such as HIV/AIDS or malaria. A few recent studies, such as Chou, Kuo, and Peng (this issue), Siu and Wong (this issue), and Hai et al. (this issue) , provide some estimates for the economic effects of SARS on individual Asian countries such as China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. These studies focus mainly on assessing the damages caused by SARS in affected industries, such as tourism and the retail service sector.
Calculating the number of canceled tourist trips and the decline in retail trade, however, is not sufªcient to provide a full picture of the impact of SARS, because there are linkages within economies across sectors and across economies in both international trade and international capital ºows. The economic costs from a global disease such as SARS go beyond the direct damages incurred in the affected sectors in the disease-inºicted countries. This is not only because the disease spreads quickly across countries through networks related to global travel, but also because any economic shock to one country is quickly spread to other countries through the increased trade and ªnancial linkages associated with globalization. As the world becomes more integrated, the global cost of a communicable disease like SARS is expected to rise. Our global model is able to capture many of the important linkages across sectors as well as across countries, through the trade of goods and services and capital ºows, and hence provides a broader assessment of the costs of SARS.
The G-Cubed model also incorporates rational expectations and forward-looking intertemporal behavior on the part of individual agents. This feature is particularly important when one is interested in distinguishing the effects of a temporary shock from those of a persistent shock. For instance, if foreign investors expect that SARS or other epidemics of unknown etiology could break out in some Asian countries not only in the current year but also persistently for the following few years, they will demand a greater risk premium from investing in affected economies. Their forward-looking behavior would have immediate global impacts. Because we take into account the interdependencies among economies and the role of investor conª-dence, our cost estimates of the SARS outbreak are larger than many of those that have recently appeared in the media.
Economic impacts of SARS
Despite the catastrophic consequences of infectious diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS, the impact of epidemics has been considerably underresearched by economists. 2 Traditionally, most studies have attempted to estimate the economic burden of a widespread illness based on the private and nonprivate medical costs associated with the disease or the demographic consequences of the epidemic. 3 To date the number of probable SARS cases is small compared with the number of victims of other major historical epidemics. Unlike that in cases of HIV/AIDS, the duration of hospitalization of SARS patients is short, with more than 90 percent of the patients recovering to full health in a short period, thereby rendering the medical costs very low (comparatively speaking). The SARS-related demographic or human capital consequences are also currently estimated to be insigniªcant. The fatality rate of the SARS coronavirus is high, but considering that fewer than 1,000 people have died from SARS so far, the death toll is tiny compared with the 3 million who died of AIDS in 2002 or the (at least) 40 million people worldwide who died of the Spanish inºuenza epidemic over 10 months in 1918-19. Therefore, forgone incomes associated with morbidity and mortality as a result of SARS appear to be insigniª-cant. If SARS became endemic in the future, it would substantially increase private and public expenditures on health care and would have more signiªcant impacts on the demographic structure and human capital of the economies of infected countries. Based on information to date, however, this is unlikely to happen.
Although SARS-associated medical expenditures and demographic consequences are generally considered insigniªcant, SARS has apparently caused substantial economic effects through other important channels. We summarize three mechanisms by which SARS inºuences the global economy.
First, fear of SARS infection leads to a substantial decline in consumer demand, especially for travel and retail sales services. The fast speed of contagion makes people avoid social interactions. The adverse demand shock becomes more substantial in regions that have much larger service-related activities and higher population densities, such as Hong Kong or Beijing. The psychological shock, however, ripples around the world rather than affecting only the countries suffering from local transmission of SARS, because the world is closely linked by international travel.
Second, the uncertain features of the disease reduce conªdence in the future of the affected economies. This effect seems potentially very important, particularly in China, which is a key center of foreign investment. The response by the Chinese government to the 2003 SARS epidemic was fragmented and nontransparent. China's greater exposure to the unknown disease and the less-than-effective government responses to the outbreaks, compared with the case numbers and ofªcial reactions in other Asian countries, must have increased concerns about China's institutional quality and future growth potential. Although it is difªcult to measure directly the effects of diseases on the decision making of foreign investors, the loss of foreign investors' conªdence would have had potentially tremendous impacts on foreign investment ºows, which in turn would have had signiªcant impacts on China's economic growth. The effect would also have been transmitted to other countries competing with China for foreign direct investment.
Third, SARS undoubtedly increases the costs of disease prevention, especially in the most affected industries, such as the travel and retail sales service sectors. These costs may not be substantial, at least in global terms, as long as the disease is transmitted only through close human contact. However, the global costs could become enormous if the disease were found to be transmitted by other channels, such as through international cargo.
Given the important linkages between countries in the affected region, through the trade of goods and services and capital ºows, any analysis of the implications of SARS for the global economy needs to be undertaken with a model that adequately captures these interrelationships. The G-Cubed (Asia Paciªc) model, based on the theoretical structure of the G-Cubed model outlined in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999) , is ideal for such analysis, incorporating both a detailed country coverage of the region and rich links between countries through goods and asset markets.
4 Table 2 provides a list of the countries and sectors that the model covers.
The model is based on explicit intertemporal optimization by the agents (consumers and ªrms) in each economy, 5 in contrast to static computable general equilibrium models. However, the behavior of agents is modiªed to allow for short-run deviations from optimal behavior due either to myopia or to restrictions on the ability of households and ªrms to borrow at the risk-free bond rate on government debt. There is an explicit treatment of the holding of ªnancial assets, including money. The model distinguishes between the stickiness of physical capital within sectors and within countries and the ºexibility of ªnancial capital, which immediately ºows to where expected returns are highest. This important distinction leads to a critical difference between the quantity of physical capital that is available at any time 
Designing the simulations
We make two alternative assumptions in generating the range of scenarios. In our original paper we assumed in the ªrst scenario that the SARS shock lasted for a year. To capture the fact that the SARS outbreak actually lasted 6 months, we now scale down the shocks by 50 percent to capture this shorter duration. This is called a temporary shock. In the second scenario, the assumption is that the shocks in the ªrst year are the same magnitude as the 6-month temporary shock, but they are more persistent and fade out equiproportionally over a 10-year period. These assumptions permit us to determine the impact of expectations (concerning the future evolution of the disease) on the estimated costs in 2003 and to provide some insight into what might happen to the region if the SARS outbreak is the beginning of a series of annual epidemics emerging from China.
We ªrst calculate the shocks to the Chinese and Hong Kong economies and then work out some indexes that indicate how these shocks are likely to occur in other economies. There are three main shocks, based on observations of ªnancial market analysts about the existing data emerging from China and Hong Kong. These shocks are consistent with those identiªed in the papers presented at the Asian Economic Panel meeting in May 2003 that focused on the impacts of SARS on particular countries.
Initial shock to China and Hong Kong
In the model we specify three broad shocks to China and Hong Kong:
1. Increase in country risk premium: 200 basis points. 6 2. Sector-speciªc demand shock to retail sales sector: 15 percent drop in demand in the exposed industries of the service sector. 3. Increase in costs in the exposed activities in the service sector: 5 percent.
These shocks are scaled to last 6 months rather than 1 year. 
Shocks to other countries
We refer to the person-to-person transmission of SARS, as distinct from its economic transmission through global markets, as the global exposure to SARS. The speed of spread is likely to depend on (1) tourist ºows, (2) geographical distance to China (and Hong Kong), (3) health expenditure and sanitary conditions, (4) government response, (5) climate, (6) per capita income, and (7) population density. There are more than 33 million annual visitors to China. Hong Kong's annual tourist arrivals amount to over 200 percent of the local population. Total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP is not small in Asian countries, but health expenditure per capita per annum is only US$45 in China, compared with US$585 in South Korea, US$814 in Singapore, and US$950 in Hong Kong. Table 3 presents indicators on health expenditure, tourist arrivals, and sanitary conditions for selected countries.
For the purposes of this paper we construct a rough measure of the intensity of exposure to SARS, based on the above information and the cumulative number of cases of SARS in 2002-03 for each country. These "indexes of global exposure to SARS" are shown in ªgure 1. They are used to scale down the country risk shocks calculated for China and Hong Kong to apply to all other countries and regions. For how to determine what the sign of the shocks should be, we have ignored the ªscal impacts of SARS in this paper. example, if a country has a global exposure index of 0.5, the country risk premium shock will be the Chinese shock of 2 percent adjusted by the index of its global exposure to SARS, which gives a shock of 1 percent.
For the shocks to the service industries, before applying the global exposure index to each country, we need to adjust the sector-speciªc shocks. Because we have only an aggregate service sector in the model, we need to take account of the structural differences within the service sectors of each country. We do this by creating "indexes of sectoral exposure to SARS." These indexes are assumed to be proportional to the share of service sector industries that were affected by the 2002-03 SARS epidemic. Industries such as tourism, retail trade, and airline travel were hit severely in that outbreak. We use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) version 5 database to calculate the share of exposed sectors in the total services sector for each country. We deªne the exposed sectors based on GTAP deªnitions: wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, land transport, and air transport. The relative values of the indexes of sectoral exposure to SARS for several countries and regions are shown in ªgure 2. These indexes are applied to the sector-speciªc shocks we developed for the Chinese economy. We then apply the index of global exposure to SARS to the resulting shocks. For example, the shock applied to costs in the service sector in Singapore is the shock of 5 percent increase in costs, multiplied by 0.31 for the 
Simulation results

Baseline business-as-usual projections
The ªrst step is to make base case assumptions about the future path of the model's exogenous variables in each region. For all regions we assume that the long-run real interest rate is 5 percent, tax rates are held at their 1999 levels, and ªscal spending is allocated according to 1999 shares. Population growth rates vary across regions according to 2000 World Bank population projections.
The baseline assumption in the G-Cubed (Asia Paciªc) model is that the pattern of technical change at the sector level is similar to the historical pattern for the United States (where data are available). In regions other than the United States, however, the sector-level rates of technical change are scaled up or down in order to match the region's observed average rate of aggregate productivity growth over the previous 5 years. This approach attempts to capture the fact that the rate of technical change varies considerably across industries, while also accounting for regional differences in overall growth. 
Results of the simulation
We apply the shocks outlined in the previous section to the global economy. We begin the simulation in 2003, assuming that the SARS outbreak in 2003 was completely unanticipated. Both the temporary and persistent shocks are assumed to be understood by the forward-looking agents in the model. Clearly this is problematic when it comes to a new disease such as SARS, because there is likely to be a period of learning about the nature of the shock. Yet what alternative approach might exist and be viable is not clear. In our defense it is worth pointing out that only 30 percent of agents have rational expectations and 70 percent of agents are using a rule of thumb when they adjust to contemporaneous information about the economy. Table 4 shows the model's predictions for the percentage change in GDP in 2003 as a result of the temporary and permanent SARS shocks, as well as the contribution of each component (i.e., demand decline for services, cost increase for services, and country risk premium). Focusing on the GDP results, it is clear that there are interesting differences among the various components of the overall shock as well as between the temporary and permanent shocks. The temporary shock has its largest impact on China and Hong Kong, as expected. The loss to Hong Kong of 2.63 percent of GDP is, however, much larger than the corresponding loss of 1.05 percent for China. This primarily reºects the larger role of the service sector in Hong Kong, the larger share of impacted industries within the service sector, and the greater reliance on trade. Taiwan is the next-most-affected region, losing 0.49 percent of GDP in 2003, followed closely by Singapore, with a loss of 0.47 percent of GDP. For Hong Kong, the increase in costs in the service sector is by far the largest contributing factor to the loss of GDP. In China it is evenly spread across the three factors.
A persistent SARS shock, according to the results, is even more serious for Hong Kong and China. The primary impact is from the persistence in the rise of the country risk premium. Although this risk premium is the same in 2003 as it is for the temporary shock, the persistence of the country risk premium causes much larger capital outºows from China and Hong Kong than from other regions studied. This capital outºow, which causes real interest rates to rise, affects short-run aggregate demand through a sharp contraction in investment and leads to a persistent loss in production capacity through a resulting decline in the growth of the capital stock. The extent of capital outºow is discussed below.
Interestingly, when SARS is expected to be more persistent, the difference in GDP loss in 2003 distinguishes two groups of countries. China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan experience a larger loss, and the OECD economies and others experience a smaller GDP loss. This reºects the greater capital outºow from the most affected countries into the least affected countries, which would tend to lower the GDP of those countries losing capital and to raise the GDP of those countries receiving capital. The countries in the ªrst group that are less affected by SARS are nonetheless worse off when a more persistent outbreak is expected because of their trade links with Hong Kong, China, and Singapore.
The various linkages have many dimensions, but a global model is able to help untangle some of the more important factors. The results for GDP illustrate how the estimated costs of SARS in 2003 can be very different depending on expectations of how the disease will unfold. It is also interesting to examine the change in economic impacts over time. We present three ªgures, each containing six charts (ªgures 3-5).
The variables in each chart are expressed as deviations from the underlying baseline of the model projections. They show how key variables change relative to what would have been the case without SARS. On the left-hand side of ªgures 3 and 4, the results of the temporary SARS shock are shown, and on the right-hand side of these ªgures, the impacts of the more persistent SARS shock are presented. This enables one to compare the impacts of the two shocks on real GDP, investment, exports, capital ºows, trade balance, and exchange rates. Figure 5 presents the results for the ªnancial and sectoral impacts of a persistent SARS shock. The results for exports are particularly interesting. In the case of the temporary shock, exports from Hong Kong fall sharply. Yet, in the more persistent case, exports from Hong Kong fall by less in 2003. The reason for this difference is that the more persistent the shock, the larger the capital outºow from affected economies. A capital outºow will be reºected in a current account surplus and a trade balance surplus. For this to occur, either exports must rise or imports fall, or both. This can be seen clearly in ªgure 4.
In the case of the temporary SARS shock, the net capital outºow from China and Hong Kong (relative to the baseline projection) is around 0.3 percent of GDP by the second year of the shock. When the shock is more persistent, however, this capital outºow (top left panel) rises sharply to 1.4 percent of GDP for Hong Kong and to 0.8 percent of GDP for China by the second year. This capital outºow is reºected in For this model we assume that the monetary authorities in both economies maintain a tight peg to the U.S. dollar. Figure 5 shows that the inevitable real exchange rate depreciation is achieved through falling prices (again relative to the underlying baseline projection) that are induced by very high real interest rates. In order to maintain the interest parity condition, the expected depreciation in turn induces high real interest rates. This is similar to what occurred in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis in Hong Kong and in the aftermath of the bursting of the asset bubble in Japan in the early 1990s, when the lack of nominal yen depreciation against the U.S. dollar (through policy intervention) induced the required real economic adjustment through a fall in prices, which, through persistent policy errors, developed into deºation.
We see in ªgure 5 that both South Korea and Singapore experience nominal exchange rate depreciations that limit the extent of price declines in those economies, even though China is experiencing falling prices. One important lesson from these results is that the popular myth, particularly prevalent in Japan, that China is the cause of global deºation involves a complete misunderstanding of the difference between the change in relative prices and the change in overall prices within economies and among economies. Deºation within an economy reºects the decisions of the monetary authorities of that country and not the change in prices within other economies. This is not just a curiosity from the model but is perfectly consistent with the observation that countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, which trade extensively with China, can have inºation while Japan and Hong Kong experience deºation. This phenomenon cannot be explained by low-cost Chinese production.
We also see in ªgure 5 that the problems in the service industries in China and Hong Kong are reºected in the share market valuations in the manufacturing sectors in these economies (lower-right-hand chart, summarized in Tobin's q). The SARS outbreak is predicted to have widespread economic impacts beyond the declines in the most-affected service industries.
Conclusion
The impact of SARS on the economies of China and Hong Kong, as estimated by the G-Cubed (Asia Paciªc) model, is large. This impact is not a consequence of the disease itself for the affected people but is rather the effect of the disease on the behav-ior of many people within these economies. The economic impact of SARS depends on the adjustment of expectations about the disease, reºected in integrated real and ªnancial markets. The more persistent the SARS outbreak is expected to be, the larger are the expected negative economic impacts in 2003, and the smaller the expected impacts in countries outside the core countries.
An important aspect of the costs estimated in this paper is the ªxed-exchange-rate regimes in China and Hong Kong, which increase the costs of SARS. The real depreciation induced by SARS occurs through lower prices in these economies, which, through sticky labor markets, results in increased unemployment. The regional impacts are also signiªcant as a result of trade linkages as well as through the direct transmission of the disease.
These results support the point that the true cost of disease is far greater than the cost to a health budget for treatment of patients. The more persistent shock in this paper can be thought of as the 2002-03 SARS epidemic's having lasted longer than anyone feared, but it can also be interpreted as a recurring series of annual epidemics emerging from China and infecting the world through increased globalization. Such annual outbreaks would not be a new phenomenon: inºuenza viruses have been emanating from China since at least 1918-19, when the Spanish ºu spread worldwide. If the threat of recurring SARS or SARS-like diseases from China is real, then the estimated risk to economic activity in the region and the world, as calculated in this paper, could be very large. The estimates of our model suggest that there is a strong economic case for direct intervention in improving public health in China and other developing countries in which there is inadequate expenditure on public health and insufªcient investment in research on disease prevention to avoid the future outbreak of a major pandemic.
